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Diﬀerent heuristics and same bias: A spectral analysis of biased
judgments and individual decision rules
Ola Svenson∗ Nichel Gonzalez† Gabriella Eriksson‡
Abstract
We used correlation and spectral analyses to investigate the cognitive structures and processes producing biased judgments.
We used 5 diﬀerent sets of driving problems to exemplify problems that trigger biases, speciﬁcally: (1) underestimation of
the impact of occasional slow speeds on mean speed judgments, (2) overestimation of braking capacity after a speed increase,
(3) the time saving bias (overestimation of the time saved by increasing a high speed further, and underestimation of time
saved when increasing a low speed), (4) underestimation of increase of fatal accident risk when speed is increased, and (5)
underestimation of the increase of stopping distance when speed is increased. The results veriﬁed the predicted biases. A
correlation analysis found no strong links between biases; only accident risk and stopping distance biases were correlated
signiﬁcantly. Spectral analysis of judgments was used to identify diﬀerent decision rules. Most participants were consistent
in their use of a single rule within a problem set with the same bias. The participants used diﬀerence, average, weighed
average and ratio rules, all producing biased judgments. Among the rules, diﬀerence rules were used most frequently across
the diﬀerent biases. We found no personal consistency in the rules used across problem sets. The complexity of rules varied
across problem sets for most participants.
Keywords: spectral analysis, driving, heuristics, biases, time, speed
1 Introduction
What do people do when they do not know the answer to a
problem and yet are willing to make a judgment? It is well
known that people often use heuristics andmake bounded ra-
tionality or satisﬁcing decisions rather than more elaborately
calculated decisions because of restrictions of cognitive pro-
cessing capacity or ignorance (Kahneman, Slovic & Tver-
sky, 1982; Simon, 1959, 2000). Heuristics or simplifying
cognitive rules make it possible for people to judge relation-
ships which they understand very poorly or not at all, but
the heuristics also lead to systematic biases (Cohen, Dearna-
ley & Hansel, 1956; Gilovich, Griﬃn & Kahneman, 2002;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Johnson-Laird, 1999; Mon-
tibeller & von Winterfeldt, 2015; Wagenaar & Timmers,
1979; Wikipedia, 2018). Detailed descriptions of the cogni-
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tive processes that generate a bias are scarce.1 Therefore, we
wanted to contribute some knowledge about the cognitive
heuristic processes that generate a variety of biased driv-
ing judgments, e.g., time saving and braking capacity, that
anyone driving a car is prone to make in or out of the car.
The method of spectral analysis, used in the present study to
identify diﬀerent cognitive processes, is generic and can be
applied to any kind of heuristics and biases.
Stanovich and West (1998) studied a set of cognitive bi-
ases and individual diﬀerences in cognitive abilities and
found low to high covariances between the biases investi-
gated (e.g., syllogism and overconﬁdence, r = −0.09; hind-
sight and overconﬁdence, r = 0.79). In a later study, Toplak,
West and Stanowich (2016) investigated a number of heuris-
tics (ratio bias, belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, reﬂection
versus intuition, probabilistic and statistical reasoning, ra-
tional temporal discounting) and related them to real-world
self-reported correlates including driving behavior.2 The
driving items were related to driving and safety but the in-
ternal consistency of this set of items was rather low (Cron-
bach’s α = 0.49), and there were no signiﬁcant correlations
between the composite driving variable and other heuristics.
1However, e.g., Maule (1989) and Stanovich and West (1998) studied
some details of individual judgment processesleading to, e.g., Asian disease
and base rate biases.
2Self-reported frequency of: talk on a hand’s free phone, talking on a
hand-held phone, viewing or sending texts or email, suspension of driver’s
license, caused an accident, speeding tickets, driven without a driver’s
license, driven an uninsured car, charged with driving while intoxicated.
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Here, we take a more limited view of driving than that of
Toplak et al. (2016), with the purpose of revealing a cogni-
tive structure of the biases and, more importantly, diﬀerent
processes generating them. Diﬀerent normative functions
predict the correct judgments for the 5 diﬀerent driving prob-
lems studied here, andwe know fromearlier studies that these
problems are associated with biased judgments (Svenson &
Eriksson, 2017). The problems will be less disparate than
the driving judgment problems used by Toplak et al. (2016)
and we expect that this will increase the chance of ﬁnding in-
teresting cognitive structures and consistencies of processes
within and across problems. Spectral analysis of judgments
will be used in the search for heuristic decision rules.
Most of the judgment biases, e.g., the time saving bias
(Svenson, 2008a), are not limited to driving but can also
be found in other contexts, such as, consumer behavior (De
Langhe & Puntoni, 2016) and industrial production (Sven-
son, 2011). Svenson and Eriksson (2017) presented an
overview of cognitive judgment biases in a driving context,
and some of these will be explored in the present contribu-
tion and described next. The problems that we study concern
driving when a person is not driving even though most of the
biases seem to appear also when a person is driving a car,
e.g., time saving when driving faster (Eriksson, Svenson &
Eriksson, 2013) and stopping distance (Colbourn, Brown &
Cooperman, 1978).
The ﬁrst bias concerns mean speed judgments as a func-
tion of speeds on diﬀerent parts of a trip (Falk, Lann &
Zamir, 2004; Svenson & Salo, 2010). Most people misjudge
mean speed because they do not weigh the speeds by time
on each road segment (that is, compute the harmonic mean).
Svenson and Salo (2010) used the following problem in
their study of mean speed “On a 60 km long road you nor-
mally drive at a mean speed of 110 km/h. A temporary speed
limit on 10 km of the distance slows down the mean speed
there to 30 km/h. This means that the mean speed over the
complete distance is changed to ___”. The average judgment
was 82 km/h , an overestimation of the correct mean speed,
76 km/h.
In the following formal presentation, we will treat the
mean speed over two road segments of a route with constant
but diﬀerent speeds on the road segments. The correct for-
mula for mean speed over a distance with only two diﬀerent
speeds is described by equation (1).
Vmean =
T1V1 + T2V2
T1 + T2
(1)
where Vmean is the mean speed, T1 and T2 are the times that
a vehicle travels with at each of the speeds V1 and V2. This
is called the time weight model (Falk, Lann & Zamir, 2004).
In most communications concerning speed and speed reg-
ulation, the information concerns diﬀerent speeds on dif-
ferent road segments of a trip. Therefore, it is possible to
assume that some people use the distances driven at the dif-
ferent speeds as weights when they judge mean speed. This
was veriﬁed in earlier research (Svenson&Salo, 2010; Sven-
son et al., 2011) and parallels results reported byGamliel and
Peer (2017) about fuel eﬃciency. Equation (2) shows how
two distances D1 and D2 can be used to compute a weighted
mean speed.
Vmean =
D1V1 + D2V2
D1 + D2
(2)
Finally, it is possible to use the simple mean of speeds as
an estimate of mean speed.
Vmean =
V1 + V2
2
(3)
Rules (1) and (2) are both weighted arithmetic means.
In (1) it is necessary to estimate time, but in (2) the weight
factor is given or apparent. Hence, rules (1), (2) and (3) form
an hierarchy of cognitive complexity because (1) includes
estimation of travel times not needed in the other rules and
(2) includes a travel time weighed arithmetic meanwhile (3)
uses the arithmetic mean only.
The second bias is associated with judgments about how
fast it is possible to brake and decrease the speed of a car
(Svenson, Eriksson & Gonzalez, 2012; Svenson, Eriksson
& Mertz, 2013). In general, drivers judge that they can
brake and decelerate much faster than possible at a higher
speed compared to a lower speed. The following illustrates
a braking problem instruction. We informed the participants
about a dry and normal road surface and told them: “Imagine
a car driving at 15 mph behind and past a bus standing at a
bus stop. When the car passes the rear end of the bus a child
runs out in the street, from behind the front of the bus. The
driver brakes immediately and the car stops just in front of
the child. Now imagine the same scenario, only this time the
car is driving at 25 mph. At what speed would the car hit
the child in this case?” The average judged speed was 13.6
mph in a study by Svenson, Eriksson and Gonzalez (2010).
The correct speed is 23.4 mph.
In this case, a problem for unaided judgment is that a
judge must be aware of the eﬀect of driver and car braking
reaction times on speed deceleration. Another problem for
most people is to judge the non-linear reduction of speed
over distance. Non-linear relationships are diﬃcult to assess
and both problems may contribute to the judgment bias.
In physical terms, equation (4) describes the remaining
speed in a braking episode at a given moment in time t,
after the driver has encountered a stop signal at time zero.
V stands for velocity at a given time after the driver got a
stop signal and t0 for the driver’s and car’s braking reaction
time. When we calculate correct speeds, we will use 1 sec
reaction time. Equation (4) describes the speed after t0 and
at the distance D from the point where the driver ﬁrst got
a signal to stop. The constant g is a gravitational constant
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(9.81 m/sec2) and µ the friction between tires and the road
surface (dry normal road surface = 0.8).
V = V0 for t < t0
V = [V 20 − 2gµ(D − V0t0)]
0.5 for t ≥ t0 (4)
The third bias appears when people are asked to judge the
time they save by increasing speed Svenson (1970, 2008a).
The time saving bias means that speed increases from a high
speed (e.g., from 90 to 110 km/h) are judged to save more
time than correct, and increases from a low speed (e.g., 20
to 30 km/h) are judged to save less time than correct over
a given distance. The bias has been replicated a number
of times also in other than driving contexts (De Langhe
& Puntoni, 2016; Svenson, 2011; Tscharaktschiew, 2016;
Tsiros & Chen, 2016). In the driving context, direct speed
judgments Svenson (1970), choice (Svenson, 2008a) and
matching speed judgments (Svenson, 2008b) were used as
dependent variables.
To illustrate, the time saved by increasing speed from 30 to
40 km/h is judged to save the same time as an increase from
60 to 73 km/h. However, the correct higher speed increase,
matching the time saving from 30 to 40 km/h, is an increase
from 60 to 110 km/h (Svenson, 2008b).
The correct rule for calculating time savings is described
by equation (5) in which, c is a constant D is distance, V1
initial and V2 increased mean speed.
Times saving = cD(1/V1 − 1/V2) (5)
Equation (6) describes another version of the same rule.
Times saving = cD
V2 − V1
V2 · V1
(6)
There is an uncertainty about which subjective judgment
rules participants use when they make the time saving bias.
To illustrate, Svenson (1970, 2008) found evidence for pro-
portional nonlinear rules, while Peer and Gamliel (2012)
reported the use of linear rules. A proportional rule is de-
scribed by equation (7) in which β is a ﬁtted constant. The
rule describes the increase in speed as a proportion of the
higher speed.
Times saving = cDβ
V2 − V1
V2
(7)
Svenson (1970) and Peer and Gamliel (2012) reported that
the increase in proportion of the lower speed V1 instead of V2
was also a signiﬁcant predictor of time saving judgments.
In a matching task the proportional rule and the rule in
Equation (7) boil down to a ratio rule. Because equation (7)
can be reformulated as follows, assuming constant distance
and that a person judges a speed increase, J that gives the
same time saving as a reference increase: (V2 − V1)/V2 =
(J − V3)/J; V2/V1 = J/V3.
A linear rule refers to the diﬀerence between the speeds
expressed in equation (7) by a denominator that is constant =
1.0. The proportion rule uses computations of two ratios and
is more complex than the linear rule. Hence, the two main
rules that could explain judgments of time savings seem to
be the diﬀerence and the proportion rules.
The fourth bias is associated with judgments of the in-
crease in accident risk as a function of speed increase. A
combination of physical and empirical facts determine the
correct relationship. The physical fact is that the energy of a
moving mass increases with the speed squared. Empirically,
it has been found that speed is an important contributing
factor to accidents (Aarts & Van Schagen, 2006; Cameron
& Elvik, 2010; Elvik, 2013; Nilsson, 2004). The conclu-
sion from empirical facts — accident rates and fatal accident
rates — is that accident risk increases approximately as a
power function of the ratio between speeds (Elvik, 2013;
Nilsson, 2004). The relationship between speed and risk of
an accident is described in equation (8) with the exponent n
= 2 (corresponding to the law that the energy of an object
increases with the speed squared). For fatal accidents the
increase in accident rate, R is described by an exponent n =
4 (Elvik, 2013).
R = a(V2/V1)
n (8)
The traﬃc environment can aﬀect the exact size of the
exponents, but in most environments they are close to these
numbers (Cameron & Elvik, 2010; Elvik, 2013; Nilsson,
2004). Svenson (2008b) showed that the average driver
underestimates the resulting increase of accident and fatal
accident rates as a function of speed increase. To illustrate,
an increase from 25 to 40 km/h was judged to increase the
risk by 61%. The empirical risk increases by about 150%
(Svenson, 2008b).
The ﬁfth bias concerns stopping distance increase as a
function of speed increase. Stopping distance is the distance
traveled from when a stop cue or signal ﬁrst appears until
the car has come to a complete standstill. Stopping distance,
SD, is the most commonly used variable to describe the
braking capacity of a car and it is often communicated to
drivers and the public (University ofMinnesota TraﬃcSafety
Curriculum, 2012). The stopping distance increase from V1
toV2 increases with the ratio of the speeds squared, Equation
(9).
SD = b(V2/V1)
2 (9)
Previous research lead us to assume that the increase in
stopping distance following an increase in speed will be
systematically underestimated.3
3For a long time, we have known that people systematically underesti-
mate the growth of increasing power functions and exponentially increasing
functions, with few exceptions (Wagenaar, 1975; Svenson, 1977; Ebersbach,
Lehner, Resing & Wilkening, 2008). In general, subjective extrapolations
of a curved function tend to deviate from the proper function in such a way
that it bends towards the tangent of the last part of the curve. Stopping
distance judgments are particularly relevant for a choice of gap distance
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We wanted to relate some individual cognitive diﬀerences
to biases and the use of heuristics, because researchers have
reported some relationships between cognitive abilities and
decision making competence, for example, Stanowich and
West (1998) and Del Missier, Mäntylä and Bruin de Bruine
(2010, 2012). Therefore, in an exploratory way, we ad-
ministered two items from the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT;
Cokeley et al., 2012) and a short version of the Cognitive Re-
ﬂection test, CRT, originally developed by Frederick (2005)
and shortened by Primi and colleagues (Primi et al., 2016);
the items can be found in the Appendix. People may diﬀer
in their judgmental biases not only for cognitive reasons but
also because they are more or less impulsive and/or reﬂec-
tive. To test this assertion, we included the complete Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale, BIS (Stanford et al., 2009). Finally,
we added a few questions about self-rated driving skill and
behavior (Spolander, 1983). On this scale most people rate
themselves as more skilled and safe drivers than the average
driver.
In summary, the aims of the present study are to ﬁnd
structural consistency across biases, to ﬁnd consistencies in
participants’ cognitive processes within a problem set and
across problem sets, and to introduce spectral analysis into a
judgment context.
2 Experiment
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
A questionnaire was sent out to 132 Amazon Mechanical
Turk respondents in the United States, aged between 20 and
66 years with a mean of 35.1 years. All but 2 participants
had a driver’s license. There were 69 males and 53 females.
A participant was paid $1.5 for participation. There were 9
participants who ﬁnished the study in 4 orminutes or less and
all of their responses were excluded from further analysis,
leaving 123 participants.
between a leading and a following car. However, drivers seem to keep a
safe headway distance based both on time and to a certain extent distance,
according to Colbourn, Brown ane Copeman (1978), who report that drivers
tend to keep a headway distance that enables them to detect drastic changes
in the speed of the leading vehicle within a certain time interval (usually
between 2 and 4 sec). Empirical ﬁndings show that the safe headway varies
with an exponent of 0.75 of the speed of the driver’s car, where the leading
car is assumed to stop abruptly. But the correct physical critical distance
separating vehicles varies with the square of the speed. As a result, drivers
will maintain headways greater than necessary at low speeds but will tend
to follow too closely at higher speeds (Brown, 1970; Colbourn, Brown &
Copeman, 1978). Drivers’ judgments in vehicular overtaking and passing
at speeds of 18, 30, and 50 mph were also studied by Gordon and Mast
(1970) who found that drivers were not able to estimate passing distances
accurately with underestimations that increased with speed.
2.1.2 Procedure and material
The task was performed on individual computers, and
Qualtrics was used to present the problems and register the
responses. There were 4 problems in each of 5 groups of
driving related problems and 4 problems about self-rated
driving skills and risk. Based on earlier research, the prob-
lems were chosen so that most of the participants would
make biased judgments. Each group of problems will be
described below. The questionnaires also included the indi-
vidual diﬀerences scales: the self-rating of driving behavior
scale, BIS and 3 items of the short version of CRT and 2 of
BNT (Appendix).
Mean speed. Svenson and Salo (2010) found that parts of
a route driven at higher speeds were given too much weight
in comparison with parts driven at a slower speed and we
used their problems translated to English and mph when
we selected problems for the present study. The instruction
included the following: “When you drive slower over part
of a distance the mean speed over the complete distance is
reduced. Imagine that you drive on a 60 miles long road.
There is a temporary speed limit of 10 miles on that road.
The four questions below ask you to estimate the mean speed
on the road after a temporary speed reduction on 10 miles
of that road, please fill in the new mean speed.”
The speed combinations for the 4 problems were (1) nor-
mal speed; 55 mph, speed limit speed 20 mph, mean speed
= ____, (2) 70 and 30 mph, (3) 55 and 10 mph and (4) 60
and 20 mph.
Braking speed. Weused problems studied by Svenson and
colleagues (Svenson, Eriksson & Gozalez, 2012; Svenson,
Eriksson&Mertz, 2013). We used the condition with a child
to make the problem real and to engage the participants in
the problem. One may argue that a corresponding aﬀective
component like the child was not present in the other prob-
lems, which could make it harder to ﬁnd consistencies across
problems. Hence, the consistencies reported later could have
been stronger if there had been no aﬀective component in this
particular problem.
The instruction to the participant was the following:
“When you drive faster, the stopping distance increases.
Imagine that you are driving past a school at, for exam-
ple, 15 mph and that you start to brake maximally when a
child runs into the street in front of you. You are able to stop
the car just before the child. You are an alert driver with
a short reaction time. The condition on the road surface is
good, dry with high friction. — Now assume that you had
driven past the school at 25 mph and from the same position
as before you see the child running out into the street at the
same place in front of you as earlier. You react in the same
way as before and hit the brakes at the moment you see the
child. However, this time you will not be able to stop the
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car in time from the faster speed 25 mph and you will hit the
child with your car. At what speed do you think that you will
hit the child?”
The 4 problems of braking from diﬀerent speeds were:
(1) braking from 25 mph compared to successful braking at
15 mph, (2) from 30 mph compared to 20 mph, (3) from 45
mph compared to 30 mph, (4) from 70 mph compared to 45
mph.
Time saving. The time saved by increasing speed is over-
estimated when the speed is high and underestimated when
the speed is low. We presented two time saving problems
that typically give underestimation and two that give overes-
timation of time savings (Svenson, 2008b). This means that
in a matching task with a low-reference-speed increase, the
judged matching high speed increase will be too low. When
the reference increase is in the high speed range, the judged
matching increase of from a low speed be too high.
The participants were given the following instruction. “An
important factor when new roads are planned and old roads
are reconstructed, is the potential of saving travel time. Be-
low you find two alternative improvements of roads, the road
improvements are planned for roads with slower and faster
average driving speeds. The roads are equally long and
carry the same load of traffic. We will ask you to fill in
a speed increase for the improvement of alternative road B
that would give the same time saving as A.” The pairs of
speed increases given to the participants were: (1) The time
saved from a speed increase on road A from 20 to 25 mph
matches the time saved after a B road increase from 35 mph
to ___mph, (2) A: 25 to 30 mph and B: 50 to __mph, (3) A:
35 to 80 mph and B: 20 to ___mph (4) A: 35 to 70 mph and
B: 20 to __mph.
Risk and speed. We asked participants to judge the risk
of a fatal accident as a function of speed increases and the
instruction was the following. “When speed increases, the
risk of an accident increases. Assume a road with a certain
speed limit and that drivers on that road drive on average at
this speed limit. Then, this would lead to 100 traffic fatalities
per year. If they drove on average faster, there would be more
fatalities and we will ask you to estimate the total average
of fatalities at the higher speed.” The speed combinations
were: (1) 100 fatalities at an average speed 30 mph if speed
is 40 mph there will be ___ fatalities, (2) 100 at speed 30
mph higher speed 60 mph _____, (3) 100 at speed 50 mph
higher speed 60 mph ____ and (4) 100 at speed 50 mph
higher speed 70 mph ___.
Stopping distance. This set of problems asked about stop-
ping distances at diﬀerent speeds. “When you drive faster
the stopping distance increases. A very alert driver on a dry
road, and with a good car may stop a car from 20 mph in 40
feet and we assume this road in the following items.” The
problems were: (1) estimate the stopping distances when the
same driver brakes in the same way at a speed of 30 mph,
(2) 40 mph, (3) 50 mph and (4) 60 mph.
Driver skills. The itemswere taken fromSpolander (1983)
with the instruction (translated from Swedish to English).
“Please, compare yourself with the American driver in gen-
eral. Try to decide if you are better, worse or just as good
as those in the following abilities.” The abilities were (1) to
be a skillful driver, (2) to be a safe driver, (3) to predict what
will happen in traﬃc and (4) to drive smoothly. They were
judged on response scales with the following steps, from left
to right: (1) Much better, (2) Somewhat better, (3) Just as
good, (4) Somewhat worse and (5) Much worse. A value
smaller than 3 indicates a “better than average” eﬀect.
Of the individual diﬀerence scales, the Barrat Impulsive-
ness Scale,BIS (Stanford et al., 2009)was givenﬁrst followed
by the driver skills scale. Then followed the bias judgment
tasks in the order given in table 1. The remaining individual
diﬀerences scales, the Cognitive Reﬂection Test, CRT (Fred-
erick, 2005) and the partial Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely
et al, 2012), BNT scale were presented last after all other
items. The items of the two last scales can be found in the
Appendix.
2.2 Results
In the following, we ﬁrst present average judgments for the
diﬀerent problems and report average bias for each problem.
Second, the biased judgments will be correlated pairwise in
a search for a structure of biases across problems. Third,
we will correlate the individual diﬀerence scales with the
biases. Fourth, we will search for regularities in individual
use of judgment rules.4
2.2.1 Structural analyses of biases
Average judgments and biases. Table 1 shows the aver-
age judgments and the correct values and diﬀerences from
the correct values. The mean speed problems gave biased
4Some of the participants made judgments indicating that they had
not understood or followed the instruction for that problem. Each such
judgment was treated as missing. To exemplify, mean speed judgments that
were greater than any speed on the parts of a trip were treated as missing.
For braking, judgments were treated as missing when they were higher
than the speed a driver was driving at when she or he started to brake.
In the time saving section, when new roads were planned with higher
mean speeds, judged speeds that were lower after the road construction
than before were coded as missing. In the risk of accidents section the
instruction informed that when speed increases the risk of accident increases
(above 100 fatalities). Therefore, judgments that were below 100 were
coded as missing. In the stopping distances section we coded judgments as
missing when the judged stopping distances did not increase monotonically
with speed. The numbers of analyzed cases when the missing ones were
subtracted are given for each problem in Table 1.
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Table 1: Average judgments and differences between average judgments and correct values. Some participants’ judgments
were not analyzed because of incomplete or unreasonable answers specified in the text.
Problem sets 1 2 3 4
Mean speed, mph
Mean judgments 42.97 (9.82) N=103 54.25(10.88) N=111 40.63 (9.57) N=94 45.74 (10.37) N=113
Correct 42.58 57.27 31.43 45.00
Judgment−correct 0.37 −3.02∗∗ 9.23∗∗ .74
Braking, mph
Mean judgments 13.94 (6.53) N=107 17.39 (7.98) N=109 26.10 (11.48) N=106 42.87 (15.89) N=106
Correct 25.00 30.00 38.50 59.70
Judgment−correct −11.06∗∗∗ −12.61∗∗∗ −12.40∗∗∗ −16.83∗∗∗
Time saving, mph
Mean judgments 41.50 (3.13) N=113 58.23 (4.57) N=116 60.41 (17.68) N=116 48.40 (10.90) N=121
Correct 53.90 75.00 29.50 28.00
Judgment−correct −12.40∗∗∗ −16.77∗∗∗ 30.91∗∗∗ 20.41∗∗∗
Fatal accident risk %
Mean judgments 126.97 (23.66) N =118 202.81 (77.29) N=118 123.85 (23.69) N=116 149.59 (53.12) N=118
Correct 316 1600 207 384
Judgment−correct −189.03∗∗∗ −1397.19∗∗∗ −83.05∗∗∗ −234.41∗∗∗
Stopping distance, yards
Mean judgments 59.89 (34.06) N=113 80.78 (53.20) N=113 103.88 (81.39) N=113 119.88 (119.88) N=113
Correct 74.00 119.00 174.00 239.00
Judgment−correct −14.11∗∗∗ −38.22∗∗∗ −70.12∗∗∗ −108.94∗∗∗
Own driving skills (mean) 2.50 (1.02)∗∗∗ 2.16 (0.87)∗∗∗ 2.46 (0.88)∗∗∗ 2.38 (0.90)∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗ p<0.01 ∗∗∗ p< 0.001 indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences average judgment and correct value. For the driving
skill scale a value signiﬁcantly below 3.0 (better than average driver).
average judgments for only 2 problems (too high judgments
when the slow speed was 10 mph — problem 3 — and a
too small mean speed judgment when the slow speed was 30
mph — problem 2). All 4 braking problems produced too
low speed judgments at collision. Time savings were biased
in diﬀerent directions as predicted: overestimated for high
speeds (ﬁrst 2 problems) and underestimated for low speeds
(last 2 problems). Risk of fatal accident risk increased as
a function of the ratio of the speeds but was generally un-
derestimated. Stopping distance was underestimated and
self-reported driving skills overestimated on average as pre-
dicted.
For each participant we computed one index value, a mean
(judgment−correct) as a measure of that participant’s aver-
age bias. The mean speed judgments were biased in the
predicted diﬀerent direction for problems (2) and (3) and we
used the absolute diﬀerences from the correct values when
we computed the average bias across the 4 problems in each
problem set for each person. The time saving bias predicts
diﬀerent biases for low and high speed increases. Therefore,
we changed the signs of the diﬀerences for problems (3) and
(4) to positive values so that a predicted bias always had a
positive value. The mean judgments for the braking speed,
accident risk and stopping distance problems all showed that
risks of increasing speedwere underestimated. Accident risk
and stopping distance increase with a power function and the
results showed that the exponent of the functions were un-
derestimated. Greater negative values indicated greater bias
for these three problems and we transformed the averages to
positive values in the following correlation table. Hence, a
greater value always indicates a greater bias. The internal
consistency of the bias judgments within each set of prob-
lems was described by α for mean speed = 0.79, braking =
0.92, time saving = 0.53, fatal accidents = 0.84, stopping
distance = 0.92 and driving skills = 0.87.
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Table 2: Product-moment correlations between the size of
a bias and individual difference scales.
BIS SKILL CRT Numeracy
(1) Mean speed 0.15 −0.02 −0.23 −0.20
(2) Braking capacity 0.16 0.08 −0.14 −0.31
(3) Time saving 0.25 −0.06 −0.06 −0.16
(4) Risk increase 0.07 −0.06 −0.13 −0.16
(5) Stopping distance −0.11 0.03 0.03 0.01
Note: a correlation of 0.18 is signiﬁcant at p<.05 (2 tailed),
a correlation of 0.23 is signiﬁcant at p<.01.
We computed pairwise product-moment correlations be-
tween the diﬀerent biases. The analysis showed that no
biases, except risk and stopping distance (r = 0.54, p<.01),
were signiﬁcantly correlated. Hence, this attempt at ﬁnd-
ing regularity across biases was not successful. Next, we
examined the correlations between biases and the individ-
ual diﬀerence scales.5 We added log of the time it took a
participant to complete the study because it is possible to
assume that time correlates negatively with bias, but there
were no signiﬁcant correlations between any bias and log
time. Table 2 shows the relationships between the biases and
the individual diﬀerence scales.
Table 2 shows a few signiﬁcant relationships between bi-
ases and individual diﬀerence scales. Themean speed biases
were signiﬁcantly related to CRT and Numeracy and the cor-
relations show that greater bias was associated with less
cognitive capacity. Greater numeracy was associated with a
smaller braking bias but not with time saving, stopping dis-
tance or risk. Those high in impulsiveness tended to make
greater time saving biases.
To conclude, the structural analyses did not ﬁnd any strong
reliable consistencies of biases across problems except for
the risk and stopping distances judgments. There were only
few signiﬁcant correlations between the cognitive scales and
biases. Hence, the structural approach to consistency did
not reveal any convincing results. Next, we turn to a search
for consistency of cognitive processes that are used to judge
diﬀerent versions of the same problem in a problem set and
across diﬀerent problem sets.
5The participants had an average value on the Barrat Impulsiveness
Scale, BIS that was 1.89 (SD=0.43) on a scale with an average from 1 to
4 with a Cronbach’s α = 0.91. The average value of the 3 items of the
Cognitive Reﬂection Test, CRT was 1.63 (SD=1.12) on a scale from 0 to
3, with alpha = 0.685. The 2 items of the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely
et al, 2012) had an average of 0.74 (SD=0.81) on the scale from 0 to 2.The
self-rated driving skill varied between 1 (much better) to 5 (much worse)
than the average. Hence, a value below 3 indicates better than average. This
scale had better than average ratings on all 4 subscales (Table 1) and α =
0.87.
2.2.2 Cognitive processes: Judgment rules
We applied a method that is a version of spectral analysis of
the responses. We localized peaks in the frequency distri-
bution of judgments over the number line for each problem.
The peaks were used to infer the judgment rule that produced
the judgments at the peak value. First, we analyzed the 4
problems in each problem set. We inspected the frequency
of judgments on the response continuum for each problem in
a search for possible rules that could explain the responses.
This revealed clusters of judgments on the response contin-
uum at a few locations. The largest cluster was around the
mode. When the cluster of judgments around the mode was
removed, we identiﬁed a new cluster of responses and a new
mode and then a third if it summarized a signiﬁcant number
of responses. Then, each of the diﬀerent mode judgments
was coupled with a decision rule.
To illustrate, the ﬁrst of the mean speed problems had one
cluster of judgments centered on the mode 37 mph, another
on the secondly derivedmode 49mph and still another on the
third mode 43 mph. We inferred that these clusters indicate
that several participants used the same judgment rule for
the ﬁrst mean speed problem. To specify, each cluster of
judgments was linked to a judgment rule that was inferred
from each of the cluster’s central value. In this particular
example the rules are (a) average of the speeds = 37.50 mph,
(b) average weighed by the distances driven at the speeds =
49.71 mph and (c) average weighed by the time driven at
the speeds (correct rule) =42.58 mph. Judgments that did
not fall into one of the main clusters were classiﬁed in a
group of unknown rules except the few correct judgments
that were included in the correct category. This procedure
was repeated for each problem in each of the problem sets.
A cluster was deﬁned to include judgments close to the
judgment predicted by a rule (± 2.5 units) inferred from
the mode. All judgments within that interval were classi-
ﬁed as produced by the inferred rule corresponding to these
judgments (e.g., mean rule). If two rules, e.g., a ratio and a
diﬀerence rule predicted judgments closer than 5 units apart,
we used the midpoint between the predictions to separate the
clusters and corresponding rules. The four problems in each
problem set showed approximately the same distributions of
rules. This was the case for all the problem sets. Overall,
then, we found no evidence for systematic changes of rules
within each set.
Table 3 gives the number of solutions described by dif-
ferent judgment rules. The rules are described in the left
column in an order of increasing complexity. Complexity
corresponds to the number of operations of a rule with the
assumption that addition is simpler than multiplication and
division. Some rules, e.g., the simple average rule, were
identiﬁed for diﬀerent sets of problems and others, e.g., the
weighted average rule for only one problem set. The results
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Table 3: Distribution of number of solutions across the 4 problems in each problem set. J is the judgment and the formulas
describe the operations needed to arrive at a judgment.
Rule and example Mean speed Braking speed Time saving Risk and speed Stopping distance
N 421 428 466 470 450
Diﬀerence J = V2 − V1 or
V2 − V1 = J − V3
115 (26.9%) 220 (47.2%) 62 (13.2%) 84 (18.7%)
Average J = (V2 + V1)/2 96 (22.8%) 116 (27.1%)
Weighed average
J = a/(a + b)V2 + b/(a + b)V1
181 (43.0%)
(all distance
weights)
Matching ratios
Speed V2/V1 = J/V3 or
risk V2/V1 = J/R3
142 (30.5%) 181 (38.5%) 225 (50.0%)
Correct 45 (10.7%) 32 (7.5%) 14 (3.0%) 6 (1.3%) 4 (0.9%)
Unknown 99 (23.5%) 165 (38.6%) 90 (19.3%) 221 (47.0%) 137 (30.4%)
show that the diﬀerence rule was used in almost all problem
sets.
Mean speed judgmentswere explained by 3 diﬀerent rules.
In all, 76% of the responses could be explained by the iden-
tiﬁed rules. The most frequently used rule was the distance
weighed average rule with 43% of the judgments. The cor-
rect rule was used in only 11% of of the judgments. The
braking speed judgments clustered around speeds predicted
by the diﬀerence in speeds and the average rule. A total of
61% of the judgments were assigned to the rules: speed dif-
ference, speed average and correctly used information. The
diﬀerence and average rules were about equally frequent.
There were also judgments following unknown rules. In a
special analysis of the unknown rule category we found a
subgroup of 6 participants who gave the higher speed as a
judgment for at least 3 of the 4 problems. This means that
these participants thought that there would be no chance at
all to decelerate the car before hitting the child.
The time saving judgments show that in all 77% of the
judgments could be described by the diﬀerence and match-
ing ratio (proportion) rules. The diﬀerence rule explained
more judgments than the proportion rule, which supports the
ﬁndings by Peer and Gamliel (2012) who found that, for their
data, a linear rule gave better predictions than a curvilinear
one.
Risk and speed judgments concerned the risks of a fatal
accident, which is approximately proportional to the speed
raised to 4. Table 3 shows that many participants instead
used the ratio with an exponent = 1.0 (matching ratios) or a
diﬀerence rule. This was the most diﬃcult set of judgments
to describe by rules and there were 65.3% unclassiﬁed judg-
ments.
Of the stopping distance judgments 69% of the judgments
could be explained by 2 rules. The ﬁrst rule increased the
stopping distance with the same number of yards as the
diﬀerence between the higher and lower speeds. To illustrate,
an increase from 20 to 30 mph was judged to give a stopping
distance increase from 40 yards to the response 50 yards.
The second rule used the ratio between the speeds to predict
the stopping distance, for instance, the speed increase from
20 to 30 mph gives 60 yards (20/30 = 40/60).
2.2.3 Consistency of rule within a problem set
Table 4 gives an overview of the rules used used in a con-
sistent way (deﬁned as 3 or more of the 4 problems in a set
of problems solved by the same rule). The criteria for iden-
tifying the decision rules were the same as before. There
were some participants in 4 of the 5 problems sets who had
2 or more missing values and they were excluded from the
following analyses.6 About 60% (44+24+1) of the partici-
pants used the same rules across problems in the time saving
set. This contrasts with the lower consistency in the risk
and speed judgments with only about 35% consistent rule-
following participants. The results show that many of the
participants used the same rule for all problems in a problem
set, but we do not know whether there was any regularity
from one set of problems to another.
6There were 19, 16, 9, 5 and 0 participants excluded due to missing
values in the mean speed, braking speed, time saving, accident risk and
stopping distance problems sets, respectively.
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Table 4: Consistency of rules applied (used in 3 or more of 4 problems in a problem set). Distribution of participants using a
judgment rule consistently for each problem set. J is the judgment and the formulas describe the operations needed to arrive
at a judgment.
Rule and example Mean speed Braking speed Time saving Risk and speed Stopping distance
DiﬀerenceJ = V2 − V1 or
V2 − V1 = J − V3
25 (23.4%) 44 (38.6%) 11 (9.3%) 15 (12.2%)
Average J = (V2 + V1)/2 10 (9.6%) 23 (21.5%)
Weighed average
J = a/(a + b)V2 + b/(a + b)V1
38 (36.5%)
(all distance
weights)
Matching ratios
Speed V2/V1 = J/V3 or
risk V2/V1 = J/R3
24 (21.1%) 30 (25.4%) 53 (43.1%)
Correct 2 (1.9%) 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 0 0
Unknown 54 (51.9%) 58 (54.2%) 45 (39.5%) 77 (65.3%) 55 (44.7%)
Table 5: Correlations in rule complexity (rank ordered from
simpler to more complex) between problem sets. When a
participant used the same rule in 3 out of 4 problems in a
set, the participant was classified as a user of that rule and
represented in the table. Unknown and correct rule partici-
pants were not included. Number of participants below each
correlation.
Problem
set
Braking
speed
Time
saving
Risk Stopping
distance
Mean
speed
−0.59∗∗ 0.05 0.44 0.27
21 31 18 32
Braking
speed
−0.10 −0.06 −0.08
27 14 26
Time
saving
0.36∗∗ 0.21
35 43
Risk 0.61∗∗
31
Note: ∗∗ p= 0.01 signiﬁcant two-tailed Spearman rho.
2.2.4 Complexity of rules across problem sets
Because the rules in Table 4 are ordered in increasing com-
plexity from top to bottom, we were able to explore regular-
ities in the use of rules in terms of their complexity across
problem sets. That is, we can ﬁnd out to what extent a par-
ticipant tended to use a more or less complex rules across
two diﬀerent problem sets. As before, a participant was
classiﬁed as using one speciﬁc rule if it applied to 3 or 4
of the solutions of a problem set. Participants who could
not be classiﬁed in this way were classiﬁed in the unknown
category. A substantial minority of 27 participants used un-
known rules in 4 or more of the 5 problem sets, and they
were not included in the following analyses. We also ex-
cluded the 4 participants who made correct judgments. To
illustrate the rank order complexity categorization with the
mean speed problems, each person who used a rule consis-
tently was given a number; if it was the simpler average rule
it was 1 and if it was the more complex distance weighed
rule, 2.
Table 5 shows the results of rank order correlations (Spear-
man’s ρ) between all pairs of problem sets across partici-
pants, describing the extent to which a person uses a more
complex rule across each pair of problems sets. Most of the
correlations are insigniﬁcant with 3 exceptions. A person
who uses the distance weighed mean speed rule (complexity
= 2) tends to use a diﬀerence rule (complexity = 1) rather
than an average rule to judge braking speed (ρ = −0.59).
Participants who used the matching diﬀerence rule for the
time saving problems tended to use the same rule (matching
diﬀerences) to judge risks after a speed increase (ρ = 0.36).
Finally, the risk and stopping distance judgments were solved
in quite similar ways (ρ = 0.61).
The time saving and risk correlation indicates a relation-
ship between judgments that was not revealed in the correla-
tion analysis of the biases. The table gives only consistency
of rule complexity across pairs of problem sets and we were
interested to see if participants used the same rules consis-
tently across diﬀerent problems sets. The diﬀerence rule
was the only rule that could be traced over more than two
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problems sets. An analysis showed that the rule was used
to judge 3 problem sets by 9 participants and 4 sets by 3
participants, who consistently used the rule across problem
sets. This indicates that the participants may have adapted
their rules to the diﬀerent problems.7
3 Discussion
In the introduction, we asked what people do when they do
not know the answer to a problem and yet are willing to
make judgments focused on driving problems. In response
to this question, we ﬁrst replicated a number of cognitive
biases concerning the eﬀects of speed and speed changes in
driving. Second, the structure of the biases was described by
pairwise correlations between the biases. Only two biases
correlated signiﬁcantly with each other, risk and stopping
distance. Objective risk and stopping distance both increase
with power functions of speed. The results showed that
the participants underestimated the exponents in both power
functions. In general, the structural analyses could not reveal
any signiﬁcant consistencies across probllems. The results
support the conclusion of Teovanović, Knežević and Stankov
(2015) that there is no one-factor theory that can explain
cognitive biases, and evidently not even in a limited driving
context, as in the present study. However, higher values
on the CRT and numeracy scales correlated positively with
more accurate mean speed judgments.
A spectral analysis was used to analyze the judgments at
the individual level. This method gives a more detailed anal-
ysis of judgment behavior than the statistical analyses that
were based on averages and linear relationships. The spectral
analyses showed that more than half of the participants used
the same rule for the diﬀerent versions of a problem. The
rule(s) diﬀered between participants for a speciﬁc problem
set, but the diﬀerent rules all produced the same bias (e.g.,
underestimation of braking capacity). Matching diﬀerences
and ratios rules were the most frequently used rules.
Svenson (2016) distinguished between three judgment
strategies, associative strategies in which a judgment is re-
trieved directly from memory, computational strategies that
use diﬀerent algorithms to produce a judgment and analogue
strategies including visual analogue representations and pro-
cessing, e.g., anchoring and adjustment. The present study
focused on computational strategies, acknowledging that few
or no associative (correct) solutions would be elicited. The
7We wanted to take a closer look at the unknown rule participants and
correlated their judgments across participants and problemswith proportion
and diﬀerence predictions. The partial correlation between judgment and
diﬀerence predictions with ratio prediction controlled was r(408) = 0.41
and the partial correlation between judgment and ratio predictions with
diﬀerence prediction controlled was r(213) = 0.29. Both correlations are
signiﬁcant with p<0.001. Hence, regression analyses favored linear descrip-
tions over ratio descriptions of the judgments that could not be categorized
as neither diﬀerence nor ratio.
computational strategies explained about 70% of the judg-
ment processes, but the remaining 30% unknown solutions
were not explained. It is reasonable to assume that some of
these judgments were random, but also that some were de-
rived in analogue processes. The present design was unable
to draw well motivated conclusions about complex analogue
strategies (e.g., ﬁrst computing an anchor in a computational
strategy and then making an adjustment in an analogue pro-
cess).
A detailed process study using verbal protocol analyses
could reveal strategies not found in the present study and
reduce the number of unknown strategies. A participant an-
swering a questionnaire on line may be less motivated than
a driver in a car to give correct answers and therefore the
present results need to be validated in further studies. How-
ever, the structure and processes producing biased judgments
generalize beyond driving to other contexts in which speed
and speed changes are relevant. In many contexts they can
lead to serious mistakes on both the personal and the societal
level (De Langhe & Puntoni, 2016; Gamliel & Peer, 2017;
Larrick & Soll, 2008; Larrick, Soll & Keeney, 2015). The
results show that if one wants to counteract or eliminate bi-
ased judgments it is important to understand that diﬀerent
rules have to be corrected for diﬀerent persons. The main
methodological ﬁnding of the present study, the capacity
of a spectral analysis to identify decision rules, should be
exploited in follow up studies.
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Appendix
Short cognitive reflection test (Primi et al., 2016)
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
[correct answer = 5 cents; heuristic answer = 10 cents]
2. If it takes 5 minutes for ﬁve machines to make ﬁve
widgets, how long would it take for 100 machines to make
100 widgets?
[correct answer = 5 minutes; heuristic answer = 100 min-
utes]
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire
lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of
the lake?
[correct answer = 47 days; heuristic answer = 24 days]
From Berlin Numeracy test(Cokeley et al., 2012)
1. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of
a choir. Out of these 500 members in the choir 100 are men.
Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are
men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is
a member of the choir? Please indicate the probability in
percent.
2. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and
30%white. A red mushroom is poisonous with a probability
of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a
probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous
mushroom in the forest is red?
